Abstract-In next-generation extreme-scale systems, application performance will be limited by memory performance characteristics. The first exascale system is projected to contain many petabytes of memory. In addition to the sheer volume of the memory required, device trends, such as shrinking feature sizes and reduced supply voltages, have the potential to increase the frequency of memory errors. As a result, resilience to memory errors is a key challenge. In this paper, we evaluate the viability of using memory compression to repair detectable uncorrectable errors (DUEs) in memory. We develop a software library, evaluate its performance and demonstrate that it is able to significantly compress memory of HPC applications. Further, we show that exploiting compressed memory pages to correct memory errors can significantly improve application performance on next-generation systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Effective use of memory is a key challenge in next-generation extreme-scale systems [12] , [14] . These systems will likely contain many petabytes of memory and will present difficult challenges to system performance, power management, and resilience. In particular, the sheer volume of memory required to build these systems coupled with device trends, such as shrinking feature sizes and reduced supply voltages, have the potential to increase the frequency of memory errors. As a result, current projections suggest that a detectable, uncorrectable error (DUE) in memory could happen as frequently as once per hour, even with strong memory protection techniques such as chipkill [23] , [33] .
The first lines of defense against memory errors in HPC systems are error-correcting codes (ECCs). An ECC can detect a subset of all errors and correct a subset of detected errors. The strength and cost, in terms of storage overhead, latency and power, varies from code to code. Chipkill-correct [11] , for example, can protect against the loss of a complete memory device, but at the cost of 4 times as many memory devices: 36 x4 devices for chipkill-correct compared to 9 x8 devices for single error correct double error detect (SECDED). Reducing the number of activated memory devices from 36 to 9 can reduce memory power by up to 45% [24] . In addition, the power and performance costs of existing chipkill-correct algorithms may prove to be prohibitive for die-stacked memory, e.g., hybrid memory cube (HMC) and high-bandwidth memory (HBM) (cf. [36] ).
In addition to ECC, current HPC systems commonly use checkpoint/restart to guard against failures. Periodically, the system (with or without application involvement) saves its current state to persistent storage. When a failure occurs, all application processes roll back to the last valid checkpoint and resume their computation from that point. Although coordinated checkpoint/restart offers very strong guarantees of failure recovery, writing checkpoints and restarting after a failure are expensive operations.
In this paper, we examine the use of lossless memory compression to protect against memory errors. Our softwarebased approach requires no hardware modifications, works transparently to the HPC application and is complementary to existing ECC-based memory protection. By maintaining compressed copies of application memory pages, our approach is able to correct DUEs. Moreover, because this approach can perfectly reconstruct entire pages of memory, it can correct arbitrarily severe DUEs within a single page of memory. When a memory error occurs, reconstructing a page is significantly faster than recovering from a checkpoint. As a result, for some applications, our approach offers significant performance benefits over checkpoint/restart by itself.
The specific contributions of this paper are:
• A detailed analysis of the viability of using memory compression to protect against memory errors; • A lightweight, application-independent, HPC-oriented software library, libmemprotect, that efficiently compresses memory of important HPC applications; • A novel, lightweight difference compression algorithm (xor+lz4); • A study that examines the compressibility of memory in a diverse set of HPC applications using libmemprotect, showing behaviors including: applications with abundant highly-compressible memory and applications for which memory is difficult to efficiently compress; • A detailed evaluation of the performance impact of using memory compression to protect application memory. In the remainder of this paper, we provide a detailed description of each of these contributions, discuss our results and their implications, describe related work, and conclude.
II. EVALUATING THE VIABILITY OF MEMORY

COMPRESSION
In this section, we examine the conditions that must exist for memory compression to be viable. Memory compression is viable if its benefits outweigh its costs. In this context, the benefit of memory compression is a reduction of the application's total execution time. Instead of rolling the application back to an earlier checkpoint, memory compression allows the application to recover from a DUE by decompressing the backup of the damaged page. 1 The principal costs of memory compression can be divided between storage overhead and runtime overhead. In the remainder of this section, we analytically model the costs and benefits of memory compression to determine when it is likely to be viable.
A. Model Description
We begin with an existing stochastic model of application execution [31] . This model captures the impact of coordinated checkpoint/restart, failures, and techniques that allow the application to continue to execute-rather than rolling back to a previous checkpoint-when an error occurs. To examine the potential impact of memory compression on next-generation systems, we consider a hypothetical application running on a system with the characteristics listed in TABLE I. Because memory compression can only protect against memory errors, we describe the reliability of this system in terms of its memory failure rate, the frequency of failures from the memory subsystem, and base failure rate, the frequency of errors from all other sources. Later in this section, we consider a range of values for the memory failure rate. In TABLE I, we define the  base failure rate as 1100 failures in time (FIT) 2 , equivalent to a per-node MTBF of 100 years. If we only consider the base failure rate, our strawman would have an application MTBF of approximately seven hours. Dividing the system failure rate in this manner allows us to isolate the impact of correcting memory errors. Given these failure rates, the following expression yields the application MTBF (Θ app ).
where d is the number of memory devices per node, F IT mem is the memory failure rate, F IT base is the base failure rate, and N is the number of compute nodes used by the application. [5] , [13] , [35] AND IS CONSISTENT WITH DATA EMERGING FROM SYSTEMS DEPLOYED WITH BURST BUFFERS (I.E., SSDS).
B. Runtime Overhead
Compressing memory pages requires processor time that would otherwise be dedicated to the application's computation. The time required to compress memory will depend on the compression rate of the compression algorithm. Additionally, each time the application modifies a page of memory, the compressed backup is invalidated. To maintain the benefits of compressed memory, each such page needs to be recompressed. As a result, the runtime overhead of memory compression will also depend on how frequently the application modifies pages of memory.
We examine the relationship between runtime overhead and the viability of memory compression in Fig. 1(a) . For six values of memory failure rate, this figure shows the fraction of memory errors that memory compression must be able to correct as a function of the runtime overhead. Each shaded region represents the set of values where the benefit of memory compression would outweigh its cost. These regions are overlapping. For a given memory failure rate, the viable region is entirely subsumed by the regions that correspond to less reliable memory (e.g., in this figure, the viable region for 16 FIT/device contains the viable regions for all other memory failure rates).
When memory failures are common (e.g., FIT/device larger than 4), memory compression may be viable even as overheads approach 20% if a majority of memory errors can be repaired. Moreover, when errors are very frequent (e.g., FIT/device larger than 8) memory compression may be viable even when the runtime overhead is quite large provided that it facilitates the correction of more than 80% of memory errors. However, if memory devices are very reliable (e.g., FIT/device less than 2), viability is dependent on modest runtime overhead. For these values of memory reliability, memory compression ceases to be viable-even if all memory errors are successfully repaired-when runtime overhead exceeds 20%.
C. Storage Overhead
Maintaining compressed copies of application memory pages also requires storage resources that would otherwise be available for application use. The amount of storage required will depend on the content of the application's memory and the compression ratio of the compression algorithm. Memory compression depends on the availability of memory resources to store compressed memory pages. 3 In systems where spare DRAM is either scarce or unavailable, memory compression is not viable. In systems where the target application uses all of the memory resources on all of its allocated nodes but does not use the entire system, additional memory can be obtained by requesting additional compute nodes (cf. [35] ). Dividing the application's memory requirements over a larger number of nodes reduces the memory needed on each node, freeing memory that can be used to store compressed memory pages. The percentage increase in application memory is roughly equal to the percentage increase in the number of application processes. However, increasing the number of compute nodes increases the amount of hardware used by the application and thus the likelihood of failure also increases. The application's MTBF is inversely proportional to the number of nodes on which it runs. On the other hand, increasing the number of nodes also increases the computational resources that are available to the application.
Compressed pages of memory are write mostly. Memory errors only occur when memory is read. As a result, the memory used to store compressed pages are unlikely to increase the frequency with which the application experiences uncorrectable memory errors; the likelihood of an error occurring on a page of memory and another error when it reads the page's compressed backup is extremely small.
In Fig. 1(b) , we examine the impact of increasing the number of compute nodes used by the application on the viability of memory compression. As in Fig. 1(a) , we consider six values of the memory failure rate and the viable regions overlap in the same manner. For the purposes of this analysis, we assume that the additional computational resources provide no benefit (i.e., the application's baseline time-to-solution is unaffected by the increased node count). Each shaded region represents the viable percentages of corrected memory errors 3 In principle, other forms of storage (e.g., SSDs, parallel filesystem) could be used. However, in this paper, we assume that compressed pages are stored in DRAM and do not examine the challenges associated with using other storage devices.
for memory compression as a function of the increase in the number of processes used by the application.
On the whole, this figure shows that increasing the application's failure rate by obtaining additional nodes can be largely offset by reducing the frequency of failures due to memory errors. When memory errors are very frequent (e.g., FIT/device greater than four), memory compression is viable even for large increases in hardware resources if even a slight majority of memory errors can be repaired.
In Fig. 1(c) , we examine when the application's scalability is sufficient to offset the decrease in the application's MTBF. For the purposes of this analysis, we define scalability, S, in the following way (cf. [18] , [35] ).
where T M is the time-to-solution of the application running across M processes, T N is the time-to-solution of the application running across N processes, and N > M. We observe that for perfectly strong scaling application S = 1.0 and for perfectly unscalable applications S = 0.0. As in Fig. 1(a) , we consider six values of the memory failure rate and the viable regions overlap in the same manner. Each shaded region in Fig. 1(c) represents the values of applications scalability for which the increase in the application's failure rate is at least offset by the performance benefits of using more computational resources.
This figure shows that for the most of the memory failure rates that we consider, the availability of additional computational resources allow even modestly scalable applications to offset the increased failure rate by reducing the application's time-to-solution. However, when memory failures are very common (e.g., FIT/device greater than or equal to 16) offsetting the increased failure rate requires an application that is nearly perfectly strong scaling. Moreover, even perfectly strong scaling applications may not be able to offset large increases (e.g., greater 60%) in process count.
III. IMPLEMENTING MEMORY COMPRESSION
Based on this viability analysis, we designed a software library, libmemprotect, to evaluate the challenges of using memory compression to protect memory from uncorrectable failures.
A. Overview
libmemprotect maintains compressed copies of dynamically-allocated pages of memory in the address space of each application process. In addition to standard compression techniques that exploit fine-grained redundancies (i.e., redundancies in a single page of memory), we can also compress memory by exploiting coarse-grained redundancies. For example, memory pages that contain duplicate content (including pages that are entirely zero) can be exploited to protect against memory errors without requiring compression. A memory error on a duplicate page can be repaired by copying the content from its duplicate.
libmemprotect works by tracking and periodically scanning application memory. During this scan, it identifies zero and duplicate pages by computing hashes of page contents. The remaining pages are compressed. Incompressible pages are replicated. In this paper, we consider two categories of compression. The first is to use standard lossless compression algorithms. The second approach is to compute differences between memory pages. The intuition behind computing differences is that if the contents of two pages closely match, but are not exact duplicates, storing the difference between the two pages may be more efficient than using traditional compression. The difference computed between two pages allows one page to be reconstructed from the other when a memory error occurs. When differences are computed by a symmetric difference algorithm either page can be reconstructed from the difference. Asymmetric difference algorithms generate differences that can only be used to reconstruct one of the pages.
B. Tracking Application Memory
libmemprotect tracks an application's memory allocation by using features of the GNU linker to interpose code between the application and the standard C/C++ memory allocation functions (e.g., malloc, free, new, delete). libmemprotect maintains a database of the application's memory allocations. Each time the application allocates (or deallocates) memory, libmemprotect updates its database to ensure that it has an up-to-date view of the memory that is currently allocated by the application.
C. Managing Memory Modification
Exploiting memory contents requires libmemprotect to have an accurate picture of which pages have been modified since they were last categorized. To this end, libmemprotect uses mprotect to make every page of the application's allocated memory read-only. When the application writes to a page of read-only memory, a segmentation fault occurs. libmemprotect uses a SIGSEGV signal handler to receive notification of each segmentation fault. Its signal handler examines the fault that occurred to identify the page of memory that is being written. It then updates its metadata accordingly, restores write privileges to the accessed page, and returns control to the application.
After write privileges have been restored to a memory page, libmemprotect no longer knows its relationship to other pages of memory. As the application executes and more and more pages are written to, libmemprotect's knowledge of the state of the application's memory diminishes. To re-establish its knowledge of inter-page relationships, libmemprotect periodically restores the application's memory pages to read-only. It accomplishes this by dividing the application's execution time into tunable protection intervals. For the data presented in this paper, the protection interval is 60 seconds long. A SIGALRM signal notifies libmemprotect of the end of each interval. At the beginning of each protection interval, libmemprotect removes write privileges for the memory allocated by the application. It then computes the MD5 hash of, and compresses all of the pages that have been modified since the beginning of the preceding interval. Because we assume that our target applications are not adversarial, two pages with same hash value will have the same contents with very high probability. Similarly, if the hash value of a page has not changed, then it is highly likely that its contents have not been modified.
We can also configure libmemprotect to periodically collect statistics about the state of the application's allocated memory. Each protection interval can be subdivided into tunable sample intervals. At the end of each sample interval, libmemprotect examines the application's memory to identify which pages have been written to. For all of the statistical data presented in this paper, the sample interval is 20 seconds.
D. Handling System Calls
When read-only memory is passed to the kernel in a system call, writing to this memory does not invoke libmemprotect's user-level segmentation fault handler. As a result, system calls may fail. If return values are not carefully checked by the application, the consequences of the failure may be difficult to predict.
To determine the extent to which the applications in TA-BLE II pass references to read-only memory to the kernel, we created a version of libmemprotect that leverages Linux's ptrace mechanism to intercept and inspect the system calls made by the application. Each time the application enters a system call, libmemprotect examines the contents of the registers that contain the arguments being passed to determine whether they contain a reference to heap memory. For the set of applications and associated input decks considered in this paper, no references to heap memory were found in the arguments passed to any system call. There are likely applications for which references to user-allocated heap memory are passed to system calls. In these cases, efficiently compressing memory without jeopardizing the correctness of the the simulation will likely require integrating libmemprotect into the kernel. 5 
E. Passing memory references to MPI
Passing read-only message buffers to the MPI library can result in unpredictable behavior. The PMPI profiling layer allows libmemprotect to intercept MPI calls that reference one or more message buffers. For each message buffer, libmemprotect determines whether the buffer occupies memory that it is tracking (i.e., whether it is comprised of memory that is or may become read-only). If so, libmemprotect makes it writable and updates its metadata to reflect the fact that it is no longer tracking the state of this memory. As a result, the pages that comprise the message buffers passed to MPI are categorized as unique in all of the statistics presented in this paper. libmemprotect currently lacks a mechanism for resuming the tracking of memory used for MPI message buffers. However, for all of the workloads that we examine in this paper, less than 3% of allocated memory is lost to MPI message buffers.
IV. EFFICIENTLY COMPRESSING APPLICATION MEMORY
The performance of libmemprotect depends on how efficiently it is able to compress pages of application memory. This section evaluates the tradeoffs involved in efficiently compressing memory. We consider two approaches: singlepage compression, compressing individual pages of memory using standard lossless compression algorithms, and difference compression, computing the difference between pairs of memory pages. We consider difference compression because it has shown promise in similar circumstances [17] , [30] .
A. Experimental Setup
This paper presents results from experiments conducted to evaluate the potential costs and benefits of compressing memory. The characteristics of six workloads are considered. These workloads, described in TABLE II, include two important DOE production applications (LAMMPS and CTH), a proxy application (LULESH) from the Department of Energy's Exascale Co-Design Center for Materials in Extreme Environments (ExMatEx), a mini-application from Sandia's Mantevo suite (HPCCG) and an example application from an important library used in large-scale DOE production applications (SAMRAI). For LAMMPS, we consider two input decks. We use 4 KiB memory pages throughout.
Because CTH is export-controlled, the CTH experiments were performed on Chama, also a Linux Infiniband cluster.
The remainder of this section evaluates the effectiveness and costs of compressing pages. It does so by examining the results of a series of small-scale experiments. These experiments were conducted by running each of the six workloads on 8 MPI processes across 4 nodes of the clusters described above.
B. Evaluating Methods of Memory Compression
At the beginning of each protection interval, libmemprotect compresses the pages of application memory that have been written to and replicates incompressible pages. This section evaluates the performance characteristics of a total five compression algorithms: two that perform singlepage compression, and three that use difference compression. The difference compression algorithms include two wellknown delta encoding algorithms, and a novel lightweight differencing algorithm developed by the authors. A description of each of these algorithms follows:
• bsdiff (and its mirror, bspatch) uses suffix sorting and bzip2 to compute differences between binary files [10] .
• Xdelta is an open-source delta encoder/decoder based on VCDIFF [25] . VCDIFF is both an algorithm and a format for encoding the differences between binary files [28] .
• lz4 is a lightweight, lossless data compression algorithm that is based on LZ77 compression [2] .
• xor+lz4 is a novel lightweight differencing algorithm that combines naive differencing (bit-wise exclusive-or) with lightweight compression (lz4).
• bzip2 is a lossless data compression algorithm that uses Burrows-Wheeler transforms and Huffman coding [1].
These algorithms are all lossless which allows damaged pages to be exactly reconstructed following a DUE. Because xor+lz4 generates symmetric differences, the differences it generates to can be used to reconstruct either page from the other. The other two difference compression algorithms (bsdiff and Xdelta) generate asymmetric differences (i.e., each difference between two pages can only be used to reconstruct one of the pages). As a result, xor+lz4 requires the computation of half as many differences as the other two algorithms.
Compression speed strongly influences the runtime overhead of libmemprotect. The size of the compressed pages dictates its memory overhead.
The suitability of these compression algorithms was examined with two microbenchmarks. To run these microbenchmarks, we constructed a library that takes periodic snapshots of the allocated memory of each of our target workloads. We then randomly chose a maximum of 5,000 candidate pages-that were neither zero nor duplicate-from each snapshot of each application. Because the difference compression algorithms compute the difference between two memory pages, we also randomly selected a second page from the same snapshot.
The first microbenchmark measures the speed of difference encoding and decoding. The results are shown in The second microbenchmark measures the compressed size of the memory pages for each algorithm. The results are shown in Fig. 2 . In this figure, a point at (x, y) indicates that for a y fraction of the candidate pages, the size of the compressed page was less than or equal to x bytes. In principle, single-page compression should never result in a compressed 4 KiB page that is larger than 4 KiB. Similarly, in the case of difference compression, the largest difference should also never be larger than 4 KiB, i.e., as the bitwise exclusive-or of two pages. However, as this figures shows, none of these compression algorithms use this optimization. As a result, some of the compressed pages are larger than 4 KiB. In practice, when the compressed page is larger than the original, we store a copy of the original instead.
This figure demonstrates that although lz4 is the fastest algorithm, it is able compress pages nearly as effectively as much more expensive algorithms (e.g., Xdelta). It also shows that the speed of xor+lz4 comes with a cost. It is nearly as fast as lz4, but the compressed pages it generates tend to be larger than those generated by the other our algorithms. Part of the reason that the compressed pages generated by lz4 are smaller than those generated by xor+lz4 is that this microbenchmark considers random pairs of pages. The likelihood of randomly choosing a pair of pages such that they contain significant redundant information is low. For the difference compression algorithms, this demonstrates the importance of developing effective techniques for identifying pairs of pages that will compress well.
These results demonstrate that there is a tradeoff between the compression speed and the average size of the compressed pages. The fastest algorithms tend to generate the largest compressed pages. To quantify this tradeoff, TABLE III shows the efficacy of each of the five differencing algorithms: the mean number of bytes per microsecond that each is able to compress out of the corpus of the candidate pages. These results show that although xor+lz4 and lz4 generate larger compressed pages, they compress memory much more efficiently than the other three algorithms.
Compressing a page of memory with bzip2 or bsdiff requires more than a millisecond. For applications with even modest memory footprints, neither of these approaches are viable due to their speed. Because the xor+lz4 and lz4 algorithms are significantly faster than even Xdelta, we selected them for libmemprotect. Although this choice means that the memory overhead of libmemprotect is likely larger than would be achievable with a more effective (and expensive) algorithm, it is not clear that the benefits of the additional compression would outweigh the costs.
C. Difference Compression: Finding Compressible Pairs of Memory Pages
The effectiveness of difference compression depends on efficient identification of pairs of memory pages for which the difference between them is small. Exhaustively computing differences between all of the pages in an application's allocated memory is prohibitively expensive for realistic workloads. Moreover, existing techniques for identifying pairs of compressible pages require multiple differences to be computed for every page of application memory [17] , [30] . To reduce the runtime overhead of our approach, we use a simple heuristic, the Neighbor heuristic. Using the Neighbor heuristic, libmemprotect computes the difference between each page of memory and the two pages adjacent to it in the application's address space. In practice, because xor+lz4 computes symmetric differences, this heuristic requires libmemprotect to compute one difference per page of application memory. We considered several other heuristics (e.g., exhaustively computing differences within a single memory allocation), but we found that the Neighbor heuristic represented the best tradeoff between cost and compression rate. 
page size (bytes) Difference (xor+lz4) Single page (lz4) Fig. 3 . Difference compression heuristic microbenchmark. This figure shows the mean size of the compressed pages (smaller is better) for single-page compression (lz4) and difference compression (xor+lz4) using our neighbor heuristic. This figure includes error bars showing the standard error for each value. However, they are too small to see.
We used a microbenchmark to compare the relative effectiveness of single-page compression and difference compression. Using the same set of snapshots described in the previous subsection, we randomly chose up to 5,000 candidate pagesthat are neither duplicate nor zero-from each snapshot. For each candidate, we use xor+lz4 to compute the difference between it and its (up to) two neighbors. We also compressed each page using single-page compression (lz4). The results are presented in Fig. 3 . On the whole, these results show 7 Results of these experiments are omitted due to space constraints.
that that the performance of single-page compression and difference compression are not significantly different. For three workloads (CTH-st, HPCCG, and LULESH), difference compression is able to obtain higher compression ratios. The difference is significant for CTH-st and LULESH. For the other three workloads, single-page compression outperforms difference compression by a modest amount; the mean size of compressed pages generated by xor+lz4 is within 17% of lz4.
V. EVALUATING COMPRESSION PERFORMANCE
This section evaluates how effectively libmemprotect can compress pages of memory in HPC applications, and measures the costs of generating and storing compressed pages. These experiments used the set of workloads described in TABLE II. We ran each workload, except LULESH, with 128 processes on 16 nodes of these clusters. Because LULESH requires the number of processes be a perfect cube, it ran with 125 process. Each experiment is repeated ten times. We perform this entire sequence of experiments twice: once using difference compression (xor+lz4), and a second time using single-page compression (lz4). The data presented in this section required 240 experiments to be conducted in which libmemprotect was linked against one of the workloads. Approximately, 11% (27/240) of these experiments failed to complete within allotted wall clock time. We discarded all of the data collected during these failed experiments and repeated the experiments.
A. Compressibility of Application Memory
To evaluate how effectively our library compresses memory, we conducted a sequence of tests with each of our applications linked with libmemprotect. These experiments generated a three-dimensional dataset. The three dimensions are: samples, libmemprotect collects statistics periodically (once per sample interval) as the application executes; processes, libmemprotect collects statistics for each application process; and trials, each experiment was repeated ten times. The results of our examination are shown in Fig. 4 . This figure shows the mean fraction of the pages in application memory that fall into the five categories that we have defined.
For each application, we show the mean fraction of memory in each category for samples taken at the beginning of a protection interval. We also show the mean fraction of memory in each category for samples taken within a protection interval. Unprotected pages are those pages for which a reference has been passed to MPI or that have been written to by the application since the beginning of the protection interval. Each time the application writes to a page, libmemprotect must invalidate the compressed version of the page, because it may no longer accurately represent the contents of the page. As a result, the fraction of protected pages necessarily decreases between protection intervals.
At the beginning of a protection interval, libmemprotect has compressed (or replicated) backups for all of the memory pages except for those for which a reference has been passed to MPI. As the applications execute, they 
Difference (xor+lz4) Single-page (lz4) write to pages of allocated memory invalidating the associated compressed backups. For CTH-st, HPCCG, and LULESH libmemprotect is able to maintain compressed backups for a significant fraction of memory. However, the fraction of pages with valid backups is much smaller for LAMMPS-lj and LAMMPS-eam and is very small for SAMRAI.
B. Memory overhead
Effectively exploiting similarity requires that we maintain metadata about the memory currently allocated. As we identify pairs of similar pages, we need to store the encoded difference and the address of the reference page. There is a tradeoff between the difference threshold and the resulting memory overhead. Increasing the difference threshold identifies more similar pages, but results in the retention of more and larger differences. Fig. 5 shows the memory overhead for each of our six workloads and both of the compression algorithms. The memory overhead of libmemprotect peaks at the beginning of each protection interval. As the application executes, it writes to pages of memory, invalidating the associated compressed version of the page. As compressed pages are invalidated, libmemprotect can free the associated memory, decreasing its overall memory footprint. The height of the bars in this figure represent the mean overhead at the beginning of each protection interval. For three of the applications (CTHst, LULESH, and HPCCG) the memory overhead is modest (i.e., less than 30%). The remaining three applications, the memory overhead is significant. This is due, in part, to the large number of incompressible pages at the beginning of a protection interval that must be replicated (see Fig. 4 ). However, within a protection interval, we see that there are few replicated pages. This suggests that the memory overhead of LAMMPS-eam, LAMMPS-lj and SAMRAI could be reduced without significantly diminishing the protective value of memory compression by leaving incompressible pages unprotected.
C. Runtime overhead
Compressing memory requires that libmemprotect occasionally interrupt the application. For example, it interposes metadata maintenance operations between the application and the standard C/C++ memory allocators. It must restore write privileges as accesses to read-only pages generate segmentation faults. As each protection interval begins, it must also change the access privileges of pages of allocated memory to be read-only and re-compress modified pages of memory. pages. For each of our target workloads, we measured the inflation of the application's execution time. The results are presented in For three of the applications, CTH-st, HPCCG, and SAM-RAI, the runtime overhead is below 3%. LAMMPS-lj and LAMMPS-eam have the highest runtime overhead. Part of the reason for this overhead is that these two application write to read-only memory much more frequently than any of the other applications. Each time an application writes to readonly memory, it incurs the costs associated with invoking libmemprotect's signal handler. Additionally, at the end of the protection interval, libmemprotect has to re-evaluate whether the page is similar, duplicate, or zero. LULESH also incurs relatively high overheads. This is due in part to the fact that it allocates memory much more frequently than any other the other applications. Each time the application allocates (or deallocates) memory, libmemprotect must update its metadata. Finally, we observe that using xor+lz4 generally results in a higher runtime than lz4, but the increase is modest.
VI. EXPLOITING COMPRESSED MEMORY
TO CORRECT MEMORY ERRORS Uncorrectable DRAM errors have been shown to be a significant source of failure on current and future leadershipclass HPC systems [47] . When an uncorrectable ECC error is detected on a modern x86 system, the memory controller raises a Machine Check Exception (MCE) in the processor. The consequences of raising an MCE vary by processor and operating system. Recent versions of Linux attempt to minimize the impact of an MCE by adopting simple recovery strategies.
For example, if the fault occurred on a page whose contents are backed up by disk (e.g., a clean page in the page cache), the error can be handled by invalidating the appropriate cache or page table entry. In the event that none of its recovery strategies is successful, Linux poisons the hardware page and kills all of the processes that had the faulted page mapped into their address space [27] . 8 In other operating systems (e.g., the Kitten lightweight kernel [44] , older versions of Linux), raising an MCE simply crashes the node.
When an uncorrectable memory error occurs on a page that is protected by a compressed backup, 9 libmemprotect uses the metadata that it has collected to reconstruct the damaged page. Reconstructing a damaged page with a compressed backup is straightforward. The libmemprotect restores the contents of the damaged page by decompressing its backup. For duplicate pages, the contents of the damaged page can be reconstructed from the duplicate. For zero pages, the libmemprotect replaces the damaged page with a page filled with zeros. TABLE III shows that using xor+lz4 to reconstruct a damaged page by decoding the difference stored in our metadata is extremely fast: on average 3.58μs per 4 KiB page. Using lz4 is slightly faster: 2.39μs per 4 KiB page. 10 8 Operating system mitigation requires processor support for resuming execution after an uncorrectable memory error. 9 A compressed backup is generated by identifying duplicate or zero pages, explicit compression, or replication. 10 It is the absolute difference between the two that matters. When an uncorrectable memory error occurs, the libmemprotect will only need to reconstruct one memory page.
The additional memory required to store compressed pages does not significantly increase the vulnerability of the application to memory errors. First, the memory occupied by compressed pages is write-mostly. Memory errors only occur on read-access. The likelihood of a DUE on a page of application memory followed by a DUE on the compressed backup during reconstruction is vanishingly small. An error in the libmemprotect's metadata does not affect the continued operation application. In the worst case, we can take a proactive checkpoint (to eliminate lost work that would need to be re-executed) and restart the application from this checkpoint. . Speedup of using memory compression to protect an application running on a hypothetical extreme-scale system (see TABLE I ).
Exploiting compressed memory allows the application to continue execution when an uncorrectable memory error occurs rather than restarting and rolling back to the last checkpoint. This increases the application's mean time to interrupt (MTTI). Using an existing model [31] we can model how the increased MTTI would affect the performance of an application executing on a hypothetical next-generation system (see TABLE I ). To account for the runtime overhead of correcting memory errors, we provide this model with the results of our runtime overhead experiments, see TABLE IV. We assume that either memory is available to store compressed memory pages or the scalability of the application is sufficient to overcome the cost of running the application on a larger set of nodes. Further, we assume that memory errors occur uniformly in the application's allocated memory. As a result, the reduction in the frequency of memory failures experienced by the application is equal to the percentage of memory pages that are protected by compressed backups.
Based on the characteristics of this system, the predicted performance of next-generation applications whose memory characteristics are represented by one of our six target applications is shown in Fig. 6 . This figure examines the potential benefit of this approach as a function of memory reliability, a concern for future extreme-scale systems. We measure memory reliability in failures in time (FIT) per DRAM device: failures per billion hours of device operation. We consider an application running on the hypothetical system described in TABLE I . This system would have an MTBF of approximately 7 hours if memory errors are excluded. We consider a range of potential values for memory reliability, from very reliable (one or two memory failures in the system per day) to very unreliable (several memory failures in the system per hour). This range of memory reliability is consistent with existing projections of memory performance on future systems [12] , [33] , [47] .
As this figure shows, exploiting similarity to correct memory errors is effective for some but not all memory-use profiles. Applications whose memory-use patterns resemble those of SAMRAI are unlikely to see much benefit from this approach. However, applications that use memory like CTH-st, HPCCG, and LULESH do can potentially see substantial increases in application execution speed. If future memory devices fall on the unreliable end of this range, as some predict for future leadership-class systems, then applications with memory-use patterns that are similar to LAMMPS-lj and LAMMPS-eam may also see significant gains.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. Memory compression
Memory compression in the form of de-duplication has been used to reduce memory usage of virtual machines for decades [7] , [49] . The Difference Engine introduced the usage of difference compression for this purpose [17] . Deduplication has also been used to reduce memory usage [4] and data movement [50] in HPC systems.
We have previously proposed the idea for exploiting redundancies in the memory of HPC applications to protect memory [30] , [32] . These papers attempt to characterize similarity 11 in the contents of memory snapshots taken from several HPC applications. While we showed that similarity does exist in these applications, the approach we used is infeasible for identifying similarity at runtime. First, we used bsdiff to calculate the difference between pairs of memory pages. As we show in this paper, the overhead of bsdiff is prohibitive. Based on our empirical data, the runtime overhead of using bsdiff to compute differences in the memory of HPCCG would be more than 50%, for LAMMPS-lj the runtime overhead would exceed 600%. In addition to using an expensive differencing algorithm, our previous approach also required computing five differences for every page of application memory. These additional differences would substantially increase the runtime overhead of the approach. Second, the results were obtained using an offline approach to characterize the contents of memory snapshots. As a result, we were unable to effectively account for the impact of write accesses to application memory. Similarly, Jaulmes et al. have shown that it is possible to exploit algorithm-specific redundancies to repair memory errors [22] . 11 Similarity is essentially a term used to describe how effectively difference compression is able to compress application memory.
Compression has also been used to increase available memory [3] , and memory bandwith efficiency [45] . Fine-grained memory compression (i.e., cache line compression) has been used to allow ECC codes to be stored without dedicated memory [26] . Similarly, compression has been extensively as a method for reducing the cost of writing checkpoint data to stable storage [19] - [21] , [37] , [39] , [40] .
B. Correcting memory errors
Given the dire predictions about the frequency of memory errors, substantial effort has been devoted to developing mitigation techniques. These techniques include: exploiting algorithmic properties to correct errors [6] , [9] , predicting the occurrence of failures [15] , [16] and the replication of instructions [38] , [41] , vulnerable data structures [8] , or entire processes [13] .
The high cost of chipkill-correct has motivated the development of many alternative approaches, e.g., [26] , [48] , [51] . These alternatives commonly provide slightly weaker protection than chipkill-correct but with lower overhead. Although these techniques reduce the overhead of chipkill-correct, they are limited by the fact that they typically require hardware modifications.
Our approach is neither a replacement for nor a direct competitor with these approaches. We present a novel approach for exploiting compressed memory to correct memory errors that could be used in conjunction with any of these existing techniques to further improve application resilience to memory errors.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the feasibility of using memory compression to protect applications against memory errors. Using an existing model of the impact of error correction on application performance, we considered the circumstances in which memory compression could be used to improve application resilience to memory errors.
We described our implementation of a software library, libmemprotect, that efficiently compresses memory pages during application execution. We showed that, for several applications, this library is able to maintain compressed copies of a significant fraction of application memory pages
We also showed how compressed memory can be used to improve performance by increasing application resilience to memory errors. Specifically, we showed that for extremescale systems where memory failures are projected to occur frequently we can exploit similarity to increase application performance by more than 45% for HPCCG, 44% for CTH-st and 24% for LULESH.
LAMMPS-eam, and SAMRAI require a substantial increase in memory.
On the whole, we have shown that, for some applications (e.g., HPCCG, CTH-st, and LULESH), memory compression may be an effective method for protecting against DUEs in memory. However, for other applications (e.g., LAMMPSeam, LAMMPS-lj, and SAMRAI) additional work is needed before this technique is viable. In particular, more effective compression algorithms are necessary. This could be achieved by designing single-page algorithms that exploit specific application characteristics or by developing more sophisticated heuristics for identifying pairs of pages that compress well with difference compression.
